Architects are fond of pointing out that triangles are the most structurally efficient of geometric shapes. However, in interpersonal interactions triangles can create the most intractable relationships.

The structure of relationships in the development process can be understood as a triangle. Three interest groups form the points of the triangle: the development team (including the owner and the design team), the regulating authorities and the community. The relationships and expectations of these three stakeholders frequently determine the success of a project. Therefore, the definition of each of the relationships in this triangle, and the articulation of the expectations, can improve the development dynamic and avoid misunderstandings and costly delays.

Aspects of the development triangle are clear and understood by all parties. The development team hopes to build a successful and profitable project quickly and efficiently. The regulating authorities are responsible for protecting the public interest, and the community is anxious that the project will enhance, not detract from, the quality of life for residents.

These goals or expectations are not mutually exclusive, but they are by no means guaranteed, largely due to the fact that each group has differing and even conflicting responsibilities. For instance, the regulating authorities have no compelling motive to accommodate the development team’s expectation of speed and efficiency. Rather, the regulators are often influenced by political considerations, which often involve the expectations of the community. The community is also not focused on process so much as the end result. In fact, delay is one of the principle strategic opportunities enjoyed by the community for advancing its agenda. Meanwhile, the development team may have the interests of the community in mind, but these cannot compete with the bottom line which is the final arbiter of every major decision.

Groups of two

This situation can quickly deteriorate into a stalemate due to competing agendas, unarticulated goals and ill-defined relationships. A structural approach to this dilemma could restore clarity and even build more effective relationships. The development triangle appears to consist of three dyadic relationships: regulator-developer, developer-community and community-regulator. Each of these dyads can resolve their differences through dialogue, but each of these dialogues inevitably excludes the third party.

An alternative would be to have the third party, excluded from each dyad, express their goals and expectations for the other two parties. For instance, the regulating authorities would articulate to the development team and the community what is expected in terms of negotiation and agreement. The development team would likewise have the opportunity to establish expectations regarding the parameters of the dialogue between the regulators and the community. And, of course, the community would be allowed to define its expectations for the dialogue between the development team and the regulating authorities. This process, if managed effectively, would result in clear expectations and a more transparent process.

Effective management of the process, however, is not guaranteed, as none of the parties to the development triangle has process management as their mandate. Yet, this is typically the role of a planning department in local jurisdictions.

It may be necessary to alter our model, from a triangle to a pyramid. The regulatory agencies in our base triangle would then be restricted to permitting agencies and the apex of the pyramid would be the planning authority, such as the Boston Redevelopment Authority in Boston. In this model the BRA or equivalent agency would not so much initiate proposals as manage the process. This does not mean that the overseeing agency would be merely a referee. The overseeing agency would establish overall planning goals, such as “more mixed-use developments” or “more green-space and pedestrian-only zones.”

The overseeing agency would facilitate the communication between parties in the development triangle and establish boundaries in terms of scope and duration for these communications. The goal of consensus would be the overseeing agency’s overriding responsibility.

It is important to note that the overseeing agency would not be entering into negotiations directly with any party in the development triangle. This is a clear departure from the methods of powerful planning agencies, such as the BRA, which wear many hats in the planning, development and regulatory process – often all at once or in rapid succession.

The development triangle, if effectively managed, has a simplicity and symmetry of competing interest groups that is distorted and disturbed by top-down interference. The overseeing agency’s goal should be limited to advancing large scale social agendas, such as transportation-based development or viable urban density.

The time has arrived when the model of competing agendas no longer serves the development process in our urban areas. Environmental interests, community activists, private developers and government agencies all share the same hope for a city that is attractive, livable, diverse and economically vital. Yet the inherent tensions of public sector versus private sector interests, as well as the inevitability of the political process, continue to prevent us from consistently achieving these goals. A structural approach to the development triangle, elegantly managed by an overseeing agency, could break the logjam and initiate a new era of strategic partnerships.